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I,. Q~EgfU. CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Trrutsactions betwe~n two associated enterprises situated in two 
different c .. >untries are soraetimes carried out at prices which Uiffer from 
those that \i'Ould have been adopted by independent parties, without this 
necessarily meaning that ru~ deceit has been intended. The result is a re-
duction of the taxable profits of one of the concerns and therefore also of 
its tax bill. 
For this reason, tax authorities faced by such circumstances increase 
the profits of the enterprise in questfon to the figure that would have ap-
peared if the same transactions had taken pla.oe between independent parties. 
2. When one country's tax authority incre~ses the profits of rut mtter-
prise but the profits of the associated concern that is its partner in the 
transaction aro not correspondingly reduced in the other country, the group 
as a whole suffers double taxation. 
Such double taxation m~ well give rise to distortions, both in 
tho oond.itions of competition and in oo.pitol movements, of a. kind that 
would otherwise not exist. . 
3. Such consequences are not acceptable within the Community, because 
they directly affect the operation of the common market. In its comm~ca­
tion to the Comtcil setting out its action programme for taxation (1), the 
Commission therefore undertook to submit proposals in this field in 1976. 
4• There is all the more need to tackle this problem in that, as .the 
Commission pointed out in the explanatory memorandum accompS,nying i te propo-
sal for a directive concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities 
./. 
(1) cor.'l(75)391 final of 23 July 1975 
of Member States in the field. of .direct taxation (1), submitted to the 
Council on 5 April 1976, the introduction of a system for the exchange of 
information carries the risk of increasing the number of cases of dollble 
taxation, especially where··tra.nsfer prices within groups of compnnies are 
concerned. For this reason the Commission on that occasion reaffi:r1:1ed its 
undertaldne to deal w.f.th the problem, stating tha:c it would without delay 
present a~ a~xiate,proposa.l to the Council and furthermore expressing 
the wish thn.t it might be adopted at the same time as the proposal for a. 
directive on mutual assistance. 
5. Certain conventions for the avoidanoe of double taxation concluded 
between r.1ember States already contain a provision directed at ending dou1Jlo 
taxation through a matual agreement procedure between the two ta.x authori-
ties. But·these conventions go no further than merely laying down an ob+i-
gation to enter upon such a. procedure, which clearly gives no guarantee 
that the double ta.xation Nill in fact he eliminated.· 
In order to be sure of suppressing such double taxation it is neces-
sary to provide that where thG tax' authorities concerned do not reach 
agreement, the cas~ will be submitted to 4 commission which will have to 
settle it. It is true that certain bilateral conventions provide for the 
setting.up of commissions of this kind, but they consist only of represen-
tatives of .the tax· authorities. The Commission however thinks it essential 
to.make certain ~hat a decision will be tal~en definitely removing doublQ 
. . . 
taxation in every case,. This Will be achieved by adding a.1 unewn munbei- of 
. . . 
independ~nt persons o~ standing to.the com@ission, which will then take its 
decisions b.y majority vote. 
These col"'li!lissions ldll by no· means constitute supranationru. judicial 
bodies ; all that is lJeing done is to expand the alreaey existing provisions 
in such a way that they will in every case result in t·he suppression of dou-
ble taxation. 
6. There is no question of entrusting the arbitration commissioners •d th 
........... 
the task of establishing rules for the avoiO.a.nce of the a.rtifici~ transfer 
of profits between concerns in the same group by means of pricing a.rrange-
~ents. The Commission, as it stated in the above-mentioned Action Programme 
for Taxation, will continue its work in this latter area with a viet'f to 
.;. 
(1) COJ:.~(76)119 final of 3l :biarch 1976 · 
• 
• 
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subodtting proposals for common rules. The arbitration commissions, for 
their part, will exanine and settle each case presented to them on its own 
merits. 
II. CQr:IMi!lfTS ON CERTAmS AR'.PICLE3 
Article 1 
~waph 1 
7. This paragraph sets out the cond.i. tions under which the procedure 
provided in the directive for eliminating double taxation may be set in 
motion. 
These conditions are as follows : 
- the tax authority of a Member State must have increased the amount of 
the taxable profits derived qy an· enterprise from trmtsactions which wero 
carried out with rut associated enterprise and which are considered to be 
lower than the profits that would have resulted from the same or similar 
transactions carried out between independent parties ("dealing at arm's 
length") ; 
- the increase must give rise, or be likely to give rise, to double taxation 
for the group of which the enterprises form part. 
8. The first phase of the procedure in question consists of a "mutual 
agreement proced~e" with rules sir.dlar to those that already exist in bila-
teral taxation agreements. This mea..1.s that where double taxation has arisen 
or there is ·a risk that it will arise, each of the two associated enterpri-
ses m~ apply to its national tax authority to obtain a satisfactory solu-
tion. Quite apart from this possibilityr they still preserve their national 
rights of appeal. This meets the wich not to restn.ct the rights which .. ;a:x-
p~crs already enjoy under bilateral agr~ements. 
9. To avoid both States seeldng a solution at the same time, which 
might result in a double benefit to the group of enterprises, the third 
subparagraph of paragraph 1 provides tr.::~.t each authority to which a case 
is presented shall inform the other auchority. 
.;. 
Parngraph 2· 
10. This paragraph contains the defirti tio:r.s of certo.:in terms used in 
the clirecti va, which are adapted ~o its specific purpose. 
The concept of "o.ouble taxation" supposes e11 increase of profits 
in one State without a. correspo:r.ding a.djustment 'trud.nc place in the other. 
Such an adju.stnent would normally be mado by reC'..ucing the profits of the 
associated enterprise qy an appropriate amount. Nevertheless it is also 
permissible to mal<:o the ac1justment through the "tru:: orec1i t" method pre:.':'el'-
red b,y certain States (United Kingc1om, Ireland). 
n. This paro.graph lays down that the preceding principles shall apply 
not only if the enterprises have made profits but also if they have made 
losses • 
.Article 2 
12• The authority to which a case is presented has first of all to try 
· ........... 
on its mm to find a satisfactory solution. If it cannot do so, it •rill make 
contact with -~ho other authority, the two authorities being required to do 
everything possible to reach a mutun.l agreement that will eliminate the dou-
ble taxation. 
£l.!'ti cl e 3 
13. The provisions of Article 3 and those which follow introduce a pro-
cedure which, because it ~oes b'eyond a mere effort by the _national tax' 
authorities to roach agreement (se~ Art~ 2 and the mutual agreament procedures 
. . 
in double taxation conventions), results- and this is ne-vt- in the effective 
. ' ' 
eliniaation of double ta.x:1tion in each individual case. This· procedur·e is 
based on the joint commission alrea<\y _pr~vided in t11e 0~ model convention. 
The compoRi tlon of this commission, whioh uncler' th~.t convention consists~ 
only of representatives of the tw9 national t~~_authcrities conc~~ed, is 
modified to enable it to make d~cisions which will completely remove double 
taxation. 
14. This COI11L1ission hac to meet uhen the national tax authorities have 
failed to reach mutual agreement in a space of two years. This limit is 
.;_. 
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necessary to give the a.uthori tiec t5.oe to reach a..,ooreenent but, on the 
other henc., it ta.lc:es account of the legi tima.te right of the enterprises to 
ob·~ail1 a settlement within a period that is not o:x:cossi ve from their point 
lS.. This paragraph lays down the conditions to be met by the two enter-
prises if the cormnission is to consider the case. 
Firstl~r, they have to agree in advance to accept the commission's 
decision, since the two national ttl:K: authorities will also be bom1d by the 
C:.ccision. 
The second subr>aragraph has re~ard to the domestic legislation of 
certain co'lmtries, which prevents their administrations from dcpa.rting from 
the decision of a national court or tribunal even to give effect to a deci-
sion of an international joint cormiri.Ssion and even if to do so would be 
in t:1e ta::-=paycr ~ E:~· favour. Vhlere relations with such a State or between 
such Stntcs are concerneG., and in order ·to avoid a decision by the tl"rn:rls-
sion which might be in contrndiction with the decision of a national court 
or tribunal, the "tl-10 enterprises are therefore presented with the follo'tdng 
choice : 
- either they ·must opt for the decision of the corn.mission, which will 
g1.1.arantee the elimination of the double taxation ; this involves giving 
up the right to a~peal to a national appeal body or the withdrawal of 
such an appeal, or else presupposes that the time within which an appeal 
night have been made has e::..'}Jired ; 
. 
or they must opt for the national appeal procedure, giving no guarp.ntee 
that double taxation will be eliminated ; such a course e:x:ciudes th~ pos-
sibili ty of applying to the con1L1ission. 
Paragr:anh .4 
16. This pm-agra~)~1 makes clear that enterprises which do not wish ·to 
2-vcil themselves of the procccture before the commission suffer no loss of 
richts in the field of the traditional mutual agreement procedure. ' 
ArticJ.c.__& 
Paro.gr.Ef:l~J.. 
17. The purpose for which the commission referred to in Article 3 
exists neans.that it nru.st be cons·t:i.tuted in such a. wa:y as to be able to make 
.;. 
.... 
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a decision that w:i.ll eliminate double taxation. This requircnent implies 
the.t an uneven number of ind.opandent pc!'sons of struJ.d.:i.ng r.1uat be broueht 
into the conmiscion so a.s to avoid deacnock "l,otwcen the two true n.uthori ticc,. 
The commission nevertheless cor;.tinues to 1)e a body derived from the two tro:: 
authorities ~ofhich, in conooqucnco, have the tas!c of appointing tlle iar1_epen-
dent persons. 
18. Sh1.0e the cases subr.U.tted ·h the commission will h.·we their Qiill 
special features, the qua.lific<:>..tions required of the in<lopendent persons 
may not ahmys be the same. For thio reason it is not laid dom1 that the 
independent perso11s should "ue gi ve:1 a ma..."'ldate for a minirr.mn period ; the 
tax authorities a.I'e thus free "'.io choose these persons for particular cases 
if need. should arise. 
The j.fember States are ho~revel"' requ.irec1. in all circm.1stn.nces to 
enst~e that the co~~ssion is constituted in good time, so that it cnn be 
summoned to meet by the deadline laid down in Article 3, parngrttph 1, a.rld 
can reach an immediate decision (see paragraph 8). 
+9• To facili ta·te selection, it is provided that it can be made frorJ a 
list. The choice is nevertheless not restricted to this list, because of the 
special qualifications that might be needed for certain particular cases. 
20. The drawing of lots is provided as a -vray ~f avoiding deadlook if 
the two tax authorities ·cannot reach a.g:::-eement on the selec·t;ion of' one or 
more independent persons. 
21. A tax authority m~ refuse to accept the appointment of' ru~ givon 
independent person whose name is dra~1 qy lot. 
22. As regnrds professional secr~oy, the independent persons nre subject 
to the laws of both Me:nber States conce::-neC., and therefore in practice 1jo 
whichever is the more strict. 
23. In order that the commission m~ operate as flexibly as possible, 
'l;he tax authorities are free to make f'u.--ther procedural rules for their 
biJ.ateral relations. 
. .. ;. 
'. 
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24~ Since it is.not the purpose of the comnission to brine back into 
question any point at issue on which the tax authori~ies have already reached 
agreement, the cor.unission's decision bears only upon the amount in respect 
of which double ta~ation still exists • 
.ArticJ e 1 
~:;g:r:aJ?,h 1 
25. The cir.~ of this provision is to preve:r..t a State from escaping the 
obligation to initiate the mutual aCTeOMent procedure or proceedings before 
the commission on the grounds that the national decision concerning the 
increase of the profits of an enterprise (or the decision concerning the t~ 
xation of the associated entarprise) has already become final. 
26. ~us paragraph deals with the circUMstances arising when, after the 
conclusio~ of a nutual azreemcnt procedure or of proceedings before the com-
mission, the national decisions on rthich they were based e.re altered, for 
example as a result of a later special investigation into a particular case. 
Ti1e paragraph provides that in such cases the results of such proce-
durco or proceedings must be modified to tal::e account of the alteration in 
the national taxation. 
Articl~§. 
~r~ill2h.1. 
27. This Article states that the preceding rules, which deal \vi th tra.nc-
actions between two legally separate enterprises forming part of the scme 
gr0up, shall apply mutatis nut~<dis to similar relations between the headquar-
ters a!d permanent establishments of an enterprise and between the different 
perma~ent establishments of an enterprise. 
P ar~'IJ:<>-j~E-~. 
28. This paragTaph deals with the situation in vthich, in the absence of 
a ta."t ng.ceement, a State's do!'lestic legislation does not completely avoicl 
double taxation bu.t brings only partial relief. 
In such circumstances this reJ ief must also be adjusted so as to talce 
account nf ru1 increase applied in the other State by virtue of the preceding 
provisions. 
• 
,. 
